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THE MCDOUGAL LECTURE: NATIONAL STRATEGY, COLLECTIVE
SECURITY, AND THE GLOBAL COMMON
SENATOR GARY W. HART
The answer we give to three questions will largely determine whether the
United States will flourish or decline in the 21st century. First, will we anticipate
events or merely react to them? Second, will we form new alliances to address new
realities? Third, how rapidly will we adapt to transformational change? These
questions share an assumption: the world is changing and it is changing fast. Our
national predisposition, however, has been to rely on traditional institutions and
policies and to use them to address unfolding history on our own timetable.
We are also inclined to employ a simple, all-encompassing, central organizing
principle as a substitute for a national strategy. During the second half of the
twentieth century that principle was "containment of communism." After 9/11 it
became "war on terrorism." Unfortunately, the period in between, the largely
peaceful and prosperous 1990s, was not used to develop a comprehensive strategic
approach to an almost totally different new century that was emerging.
One lone effort represents the exception. In January 2001, the U.S.
Commission on National Security for the 21st Century produced a road map for
national security for the first quarter of this century. It was almost totally ignored
and, one decade later, of its fifty specific recommendations only one-the creation
of a Department of Homeland Security-has been adopted.
There are reasons for our lassitude, our false sense of security, and our
reliance on reaction. Between 1812 and 2001 our continental home was not
attacked. And because we are a large island nation, we have felt ourselves to be
invulnerable. Our economic expansion between the end of World War II and the
first oil embargo of 1974 created a very large, productive, and secure middle class.
We have possessed economic and military superiority for more than half of a
century.
For most of our history, strategic thinking and planning, especially on the
grand scale, has been an enterprise confined largely to the academy. Instead, our
policymakers would deal with events as they arose. Further, as a dominant power
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in the nation-state era, we could always try to rely on protectionism and tightened
borders to keep the turbulent world at bay. No longer. Isolation and a policy of
reaction are impossible in the 21st century.
I. HISTORIC REVOLUTIONS AND NEw REALITIES
Multiple revolutions will continue to remake the world for decades to come.
Globalization-the internationalization of finance, commerce, and markets-is
making national boundaries economically redundant. Notice the mounting,
unresolved struggles within the Eurozone. Further, information has replaced
manufacturing as the economic base of our nation, and it is furiously integrating
global networks. Together, globalization and information are eroding the
sovereignty of nation-states. And this erosion has contributed to the
transformation of war, and the changing nature of conflict.
As the Arab Spring has demonstrated, the state no longer possesses the ability
to control the free flow of information. Also the nation-state no longer possesses
the monopoly on violence that was the principal product of the Westphalian
settlement in the mid-17th century. On September 11, 2001, the most powerful
nation on earth could not guarantee the protection of its citizens. A world
accustomed to a two dimensional chess board suddenly found that a third
dimension had crystalized. Our nation had organized its international relations on
the plane of the nation-state. In a heart-beat we are now forced to recognize the
new dimension represented by the stateless nation.
In large part because of these multiple political, economic, and social
revolutions, a host of new realities characterize the 21st century. These include:
failed and failing states; mass south-north migrations; proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction; the rise of ethnic nationalism and religious fundamentalism; the
emergence of tribes, clans, and gangs as alternatives to the nation-state; the threat
of pandemics; energy interdependence; climate change; and many other new
phenomena.
It might be argued that this plethora of new realities dictates a wholly
pragmatic, case-by-case response. It might better be argued, however, that now
more than ever the United States requires a grand strategy that seeks to
consistently apply its powers and resources to the achievement of its large
purposes over time. That was the definition of grand strategy provided by Basil
Liddell Hart following World War II. A new grand strategy is required because
the new realities I have listed share two qualities: first, they cannot be adequately
addressed by military means; and, second, they cannot be solved by one nation
alone.
Further, as events accelerate, response times shorten. Once a threat is
immediate, deliberation formation of ad-hoc responses and coalitions, and sifting
through alternatives all become luxuries. In this century events and their
repercussions will not wait for us to organize ourselves and our allies. A strategy
of ad-hoc reaction will not work. This being true, deduction alone dictates a
strategy that is internationalist, one that appeals to the common interests of the
like-minded, that is to say democratic-nations; one that anticipates, and one that
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requires burden-sharing among those who occupy a global commons. For it is the
notion of a global commons, both actual and virtual, that must characterize
America's 21st century grand strategy. National goals now can be achieved only
through increased international integration and collaboration.
II. ELEMENTS OF A NATIONAL STRATEGY: THE GLOBAL COMMONS
Three guiding principles might structure such a U.S. strategy: economic
innovation, networked sovereignty, and integrated security. First, the United
States cannot play a constructive global leadership role in organizing the virtual
global commons without a fundamentally restructured economy. Global
diplomatic engagement and international security cannot be financed with
borrowed money. Neither true security nor leadership can be founded on debt.
The only way for the United States to reliably pay for its international engagement
and its security is by revenue it generates through its own creative economic
activity.
For the time being, the United States will remain superior in economic,
political, and military terms. But we can maintain our leadership position over
time only through economic innovation and creativity. We cannot continue to
finance our military establishment with its far-flung operations-including in two
current wars-by borrowing money from the Chinese and from future generations.
Though it is becoming a somewhat worn theme, it is nonetheless true: we
must invest public funds and private capital in science and technology, our
universities and laboratories, corporate research, and multiple facets of innovation
both to drive our own economic expansion and to market our innovations to the
world. Through the realignment of fiscal incentives and disincentives, the United
States must transform itself from a debtor, consuming nation to a creditor,
producing nation. Governments and peoples around the world will find an
economically creative U.S. an attractive model to follow. That attraction ensures
U.S. international leadership. That leadership can organize the security of the
global commons.
Second, founding America's role in the world on the notion of a global
commons requires identifying common threats before they become toxic, and it
means identifying common interests requiring common pursuits in advance of
those threats. The primary resistance to the notion of a global commons is located
in the concept of national sovereignty. But, as NATO prosed following World
War II and throughout the Cold War, shared security is not a threat to national
identities and notions of self-govemance.
There are a number of illustrations of how the security of the commons might
work. First, the public health services of advanced nations can be networked
through common databases and communications systems to identify and
quarantine viral pandemics before they spread, and can be used to organize
medical response teams and regional stockpiles of immunization agents to
facilitate containment. Second, an international constabulary force can be created,
possibly under NATO auspices, to manage failing states and tribal conflicts while
diplomats negotiate restructuring agreements. Rwanda, Darfur, and Kosovo in the
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past, and Somalia, Sudan, and Libya today all suggest conflicts that could have
been anticipated and might be managed with much less loss of life.
Third, the existing International Atomic Energy Agency could be
strengthened to become the indispensable agency for inspection of suspected
manufacturing and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction. Its mandate should
be enforced and expanded, as it was not in Iraq, by the U.S. and the international
community. Fourth, it is not too soon to design an administrative and enforcement
mechanism for an international treaty on carbon reduction: a climate treaty will not
be self-enforcing.
Fifth, the most unstable region of the world, the Persian Gulf, is the source of
one quarter of U.S. oil imports and a substantial amount of the importing world's
supplies. Currently, the U.S. is the defacto guarantor of those oil supplies as well
as of the broader sea lanes of communications. As a loose consortium of nations
with shipping interests now seeks to control piracy off the Somali coast, so a more
tightly-knit consortium should share responsibility for policing the Persian Gulf
and guaranteeing all importing nations' oil supplies.
All these issues, and many more, represent the world of the 21st century,
much more a global commons than a hodge-podge of fractious nations and
percolating conflicts in constant tension. Stable nations will increasingly find
common cause in reducing and where possible eliminating local conflicts through
threat reduction and confinement-before they mutate and become toxic.
The central principle at work here is "networked sovereignty," the willingness
of participating nations to link their governing agencies and institutions with those
of other friendly nations. Nations, especially powerful nations, will continue to
arm themselves. But they will find it appealing, politically and financially, to
network their military assets in pursuit of common security interests. As NATO
represents the triumph of collective security in a Cold War century, new realities
now require new alliances beyond the capabilities that NATO represents.
Forming new alliances with emerging regional power centers offers several
advantages. Regional powers-China, India, Russia-should be made responsible
partners rather than antagonists or rivals. Identifying mutual and collective
security interests with the U.S. and formalizing a collective approach to securing
these interests empowers regional leaders further, and signals that the U.S. respects
their legitimate concerns.
Formal regional security alliances create diplomatic and administrative
structures that anticipate, rather than react to, new realities and threats in their
respective regions. Thus, a third pillar of America's 21st century strategy is
integrated security. While a creative economy provides the resources, we pursue
our global security in and through the global commons which we lead. A strong
consortium of twenty to thirty nations can anticipate and minimize threats from
non-military realities and can confine local conflicts before they become viral.
Nations not sharing democratic principles and institutions will find it
profitable to begin to adopt these principles and institutions as the price of shelter
under the security umbrella of the global commons. Political accommodation to
enter the commons will more than pay for itself in enhanced shared security,
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including protection from pandemics, control of dangerous weapons, climate
stabilization, isolation of terrorism, guaranteed oil supplies, and stabilization of
disintegrating states.
For example, there is every reason to create what I have called a "zone of
international interest" in the Persian Gulf whereby a collection of major oil
importing nations guarantees continued distribution of petroleum resources from
the region regardless of almost inevitable instability within and among producing
states. There are many reasons for having an international rapid deployment force
to intervene in failing states both to prevent civil wars and, if necessary, to create a
security environment in which diplomats can manage a peaceful restructuring of
nations. Likewise, if climate damage creates massive dislocations due to increased
coastal water levels, decreased water supplies, and crop dislocations-as predicted
by senior retired military officers-the United States should now take leadership to
create international institutions and capabilities to anticipate and limit the
disruptions and instability these conditions will create.
A strategy of the global commons is anticipatory rather than reactive,
appreciating that major disruptions will occur globally so rapidly that reliance on
extended time to react is unrealistic. Diplomatic exchanges that took six months to
transit between the United States and Europe at our founding, or six weeks a
century ago, now take fewer than six seconds.
III. NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Within the context of organizing the global commons as a diplomatic
platform and security establishment, the United States will find it necessary to
make several unilateral adjustments to its security policy to account for the new
realities of the 21st century. The United States is an island nation not a continental
power. As an island nation we will require greater maritime assets, both for
increased open-ocean operations as well as closer-to-shore conflict resolution and
rapid-insertion operations.
To achieve these and other security objectives, however, we must
acknowledge the political limits represented by organizing our security operations
on an outdated statutory base. The Cold War national security state was
established by the National Security Act of 1947 that unified the Army, Navy, and
the Marine Corps under a new Department of Defense, and added a new service,
the U.S. Air Force. It established the Central Intelligence Agency and created the
National Security Council. For sixty-four years, with some notable exceptions,
that legislation has served us well.
But, as Thomas Jefferson famously wrote, to expect each generation to
govern itself with the laws and policies of previous generations is to expect a man
to wear the coat he wore as a lad. Times change, and laws and policies-as well as
institutions and the human mind-must keep pace.
Historic nation-state wars, though always plausible, are declining. Irregular,
unconventional warfare involving dispersed terrorist cells, stateless nations,
insurgencies, and tribes, clans, and gangs are increasing dramatically. Pakistan-
whose instability imperils regional and possibly global security-is threatened by
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indigenous religious fundamentalists. Mexico is endangered by indigenous drug
cartels that are defacto private armies. Iraq's and Afghanistan's ancient tribal and
sectarian conflicts will continue for decades. Our massive military superiority
cannot resolve these and a number of other conflicts by its sheer size and power.
Extended discussion on future security within the broader security community
and public at large should encompass at least these questions: (1) what is the nature
of the threats we face, and which of these require military response; (2) is the
intelligence community properly coordinated and focused on emerging realities;
(3) are new international coalitions needed for non-military concerns-such as
failed states, radical fundamentalism, pandemics, climate degradation, energy
dependence, and resource competition; and, (4) does our government require new
legislative authority to achieve national security under dramatically changing
conditions? All of these considerations, and more, should lead us to debate and
adopt a new National Security Act for the 21st century. Oddly, no discussion of
this necessity is taking place.
VI. CONCLUSION: A LONG-OVERDUE STRATEGY PROJECT
To summarize, a new century characterized by a host of new realities requires
us to think anew-in other words, to think as creatively as the great statesmen who
organized the post-World War II world between 1945 and 1948. Our new national
strategy requires an economy based on innovative investment and creative
productivity that will finance the diplomatic initiatives involved in organizing a
21st century global commons composed, at the outset, of democratic nations.
That consortium's principle objective will be to anticipate non-military threats and
unconventional conflict, and reduce their impacts. The United States will qualify
to lead this new era of internationalism by revitalizing its economy and by
strategically adapting its own statutory and institutional systems to the world of
today and not the one of yesterday.
The net result of the comprehensive undertaking proposed here will be a 21st
century grand strategy for the United States, underwritten by a new statutory base,
that matches our economic, political, and military powers to the achievement of the
large purposes embodied in our continued international leadership. The principal
product of this strategy will be the establishment of a 21st century global commons
to provide stability to the international community in this turbulent new century.
6 VOL. 41:1
